

Radicalism of university student: an analysis of causal factors and models of radicalization

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Abstract This study aims to determine the causal factors and models of radicalization among young generation. The research data were processed from various literatures using several specified procedures, including the process of compiling, analyzing, and drawing conclusions from various reputable national and international journals relevant and online news portals related to radicalism among students. The results of the research show that radicalization occurs at two main levels, namely micro and macro. As well as specifically caused by push, pull and personal factors. The tendency of vulnerable individuals (students) to be affiliated with radical groups because the process of radicalization that is formed through phases or stages becomes increasingly radical. The process starts from the phase of sensitivity to deviant ideology, changes in behavior, joining radical groups to ending in acts of violence (terrorism).

Keywords: *University students, radicalization, micro factors, macro factors*

Abstrak Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui faktor-faktor penyebab dan model radikalisasi di kalangan generasi muda. Data hasil penelitian diolah dari berbagai literatur dengan beberapa prosedur yang ditentukan, meliputi proses kompilasi, analisis, dan simpulan dari berbagai jurnal nasional dan internasional bereputasi yang relevan serta portal berita online terkait radikalisme di kalangan mahasiswa. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa radikalisasi terbentuk dalam dua level utama, yaitu mikro dan makro. Serta secara spesifik disebabkan oleh faktor pendorong, penarik dan pribadi. Kecenderungan individu (mahasiswa) rentan berafiliasi dengan kelompok radikal karena proses radikalisasi yang terbentuk melalui fase atau tahapan-tahapan menjadi semakin radikal. Prosesnya dimulai dari fase kepekaan akan ideologi menyimpang, perubahan perilaku, bergabungnya pada kelompok radikal hingga berujung pada tindakan aksi kekerasan (terorisme).

Kata Kunci : *Mahasiswa, radikalisasi, faktor mikro, faktor makro*

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Introduction

Radicalism among Indonesian students has become a troubling issue for society and the government in recent years. The rapid advancement of communication technology has become a strategic bridge for the emergence and development of radical-terrorism ideas that threaten national security (Eatwell and Goodmin, 2010: p. 199), especially among the younger generation (Cloud, Spiller & Whiting, 2019).

Campus is a gateway for attracting individuals in the process of radicalization. This condition is supported by some data in several countries, such as the UK which shows that terrorists were educated at several British universities (McGlynn & McDaid, 2019). Many cases of radicalism involve students, including those associated with terrorist organizations.

Basically radicalism and terrorism are two different terms. Radicalism is a process in which individuals or groups are indoctrinated with a set of beliefs that support acts of terrorism (Rahimullah et. all, 2013, p.20). Radicalization is a precursor to terrorism (Sageman, 2004), although in some cases individuals who are radicalized do not necessarily commit terrorism. Terrorism becomes an act of violence which is usually carried out for the purpose of achieving changes in behavior and political goals by creating fear in society at large. Terrorist networks as a form of action from radical understanding are carried out in a premeditated way and in groups (Spaaij, R., 2010, p. 857).

However, concerns about radicalism among Indonesian students are not only related to acts of terrorism. Some radical movements that do not use violence, such as the separatist movement and the anti-government movement which use a political and social approach, are also increasingly becoming the attention of the government and society.

In mid-2018, the National Counter-terrorism Agency (BNPT) and BIN conducted field research at various state universities in Indonesia. From this research, BIN found that 24% of students agreed with the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia (news.detik.com, 2018), while BNPT found that there were 7 state universities in Java that were radical. The seven PTNs are the University of Indonesia (UI), Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB), Diponegoro University (Undip), to 10 November Institute of Technology (ITS), Airlangga University (Unair), and Brawijaya University (UB).) (liputan6.com, 2019).

Even so, it does not mean that other PTNs are not affected by the ideology of radicalism. As Hamli stated (in cnnindonesia.com, 2019), that almost all PTNs have been exposed to radicalism, the only difference being the degree of exposure. As quoted in the 28th edition of Tempo magazine (2018) which recorded in an investigative report entitled, "Radical Understanding in Our Campus". Tempo highlighted the case of Duo Siska, two young women who came to the Depok Mobile Brigade Headquarters to support terrorists. Since 2012, campus radicalization has become a much-highlighted issue. There are at least 30 students at Jenderal Soedirman University (Unsoed) Purwokerto, Central Java who are suspected of being affiliated with the Indonesian Islamic State Network (NII). Since 2009 there have been at least 43 Unsoed students who are members of NII (Huda, U, et al, 2018, p. 542).

Seeing the many radicalism movements that are happening in Indonesia at the moment, it is not something that appears alone in the midst of campuses. Radicalism arises because of a process of communication with radical networks outside the campus. Thus, the radical movements that have existed so far, try to make a metamorphosis by recruiting students, as educated people (Saifuddin, 2011, p. 18). According to Bruinessen (2002, pp. 117-154), the roots of contemporary Islamic radicalism can be traced to the political Islam movement in Indonesia in the 1940s, namely Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII). In the decades that followed until reformation, this political movement transformed into a number of forms and organizations, such as the Jihad Command, Jihadis, Mujahidin Nusantara to Jamaah Islamiyah. One of the important variants in this transformation process is a new type of Islamic political movement that emerged in the 1980s

which Bruinessen calls “Campus Islam”, which specifically takes the locus of the movement among educated tertiary institutions, especially famous state university campuses.

Radicalism in the Cambridge dictionary is known as “radical” which means people who support major social and political changes. There is nothing wrong with that meaning. However, in the West the meaning of radicalism has undergone a drastic shift in connotations. Prior to the 19th century, radicalism had positive connotations that correlated with liberal, anti-church, pro-democratic and progressive political positions, whereas after the 19th century, its connotations changed to negative, which put it on a par with “radical Islamism” (a term that became opposite of the actual conception of Islam), anti-liberal, fundamentalism, anti-democratic and regressive (Schimid, 2013a, p. 6). In another view, Simon Tormey (in Azca, 2014, p. 14), states that radicalism as a contextual and positional concept is the antithesis of orthodox or mainstream in various fields. In Science studies, radicalism is defined as a view that want to make fundamental changes according to his interpretation of social reality or the ideology he adheres to. Radicalism becomes a process of adapting radical ideas accompanied by a willingness to support or be directly involved in acts of violence (Dalgaard-Niesen, 2010, p. 801).

Radicalism series causing unrest and social conflict and often associated with religion. Imran (2000, p. 86) mentions at least two reasons why religion needs to be emphasized in the discussion of unrest or social conflict. First, there are indications that socio-economic modernization in various places populated by Muslims, actually encouraged the increase religiosity, not secularism. Even though it's increase of religiosity also occurs among adherents of other religions. What happened to Muslims is blatant. The problem is that the process turns out to be loading potential that can disturb the harmony of interreligious relations. In such a society, militancy tends to increase, fundamentalism grows, tolerance between religious adherents decrease. *Second*, there are allegations that the process is the same results in a loosening of the relationship among adherents of religion with religious institutions that serve him.

Seeing the many radicalism movements that are happening in Indonesia at the moment, especially among students, it would be more interesting if we explored more deeply the factors that trigger the radicalization process and the characteristics of the radicalization models that often appear among Indonesian students. As described by Veldhuis and Staun (2009) that trigger factors consist of two main levels, namely micro (individuals) and macro (community). Meanwhile according to Doosje, et. al. (2016) that the model characteristics of radicalization form a central element which is shown into three phases during the radicalization process, namely (1) the sensitivity phase, (2) the group membership phase, and (3) the action phase. Due to the importance of understanding this type of radicalization, we hope that the causal factors and the root model of radicalization serve as a starting point for obtaining specific hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms responsible for causing radicalization (Veldhuis, T. & Staun, J., 2009, p. 8).

Methods

This type of research is a literature study (*library research*) which aims to collect information about the causes and models of radicalization among students. This study is a way for researchers to use scientifically designed references by following a directed pattern. Starting with data collection. The data obtained is analyzed until it is presented so that it can provide accurate, comprehensive and balanced information through the process of compiling, analyzing, and drawing conclusions from various relevant journals, nationally and internationally, theses and dissertations, books, and online news portals related to radicalism among students.

Results and Discussion

Overview of Characteristics of Radicalization

Radicalization is a process (Tusini, 2019), whereby people become increasingly motivated to use violent means against outgroup members or symbolic targets to achieve behavioral changes and political goals (Doosje, et. al., 2016: p. 5). While other definitions are elaborated by Vergani et. all (2018, p. 3) which suggests that radicalization is divided into two main types, namely behavioral radicalization and cognitive radicalization. The first type of radicalization has a focus on individual involvement in acts of violence. Whereas in this type of cognitive radicalism, the main focus is directed at individual adoption and internalization of violent and extremist beliefs. Basically these two things go hand in hand, but in some contexts, many individuals/people behave in radicalization without being preceded/accompanied by significant cognitive radicalism.

Various types of radical groups have the same characteristics as: (1) radical groups view serious problems in society. This problem is different for each radical group (Bergen et.al., 2015; Borum R., 2015); (2) radical groups are very dissatisfied with the current state institutions or institutions in dealing with political, socio-cultural and economic issues. This creates low institutional trust (Moghaddam, 2005; Doosje et. al., 2013); (3) radical groups view their group's norms and values as higher than other groups (Doosje et. al., 2013); (4) radical groups adhere to ideologies that legitimize violence to overcome problems and this violence is directed at outside groups (society) (Schmid, A., 2016); (5) radical groups firmly believe that the use of force is the best step to take. As a result, radical groups tend to agree that violence committed by their members is the most effective way to achieve their ideological goals (Doosje et. al., 2013).

Factors Causing Radicalization

In general, the factors that cause radicalization towards extremism have various views, including things that are relative deprivation, namely the condition of a person where there is a gap between expectations and reality (Gurr, 1970). These factors are diverse and can occur due to the influence of external ideologies that are irrelevant to the ideology of the nation (Pape, 2006), problems of individual identity (Choudhury, 2007; Roy, 2004), poor political, socio-cultural and economic integration (Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 2006), feelings of humiliation and intimidation (Richardson, 2006), and other psychological factors (Victoroff, 2005). However, although all of these factors can contribute to radicalization, none are sufficiently independent to explain the drastic changes in attitudes and behavior experienced by individuals affected by radicalization.

In this paper, the author wants to describe the factors that cause radicalization in two articles that provide a comprehensive picture of this. First, the view from Veldhuis and Staun (2009), in his writing entitled "Islamist Radicalization: A root cause Model" which suggests that factors causing radicalization occur at the macro and micro level (level), and are strengthened by views of Doosje, et. al., (2016: pp. 6-8) that there is another level between the two factors, namely at the meso (group) level. These causative factors are interdependent in shaping a person's state of radicalization, which is more or less likely to occur in the process of radicalization. Second, Vergani's opinion (et al., 2018) is written in an article entitled "*The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization into Violent Extremism*", has conducted an analytical review in gathering reasons for radicalization and showing variants in various regions of the world through examining articles published between 2001 to 2015 regarding the causes of radicalization to become violent extremists and grouping them into three broad categories, namely push factors, pull factors, and personal factors/ individual.

Views of Veldhuis & Staun (2009)

This view can be explained in detail in the form of categorization of radicalization factors in the following figure:

Table 1. Categorization of Factors that Cause Radicalization

Levels		Types of radicalization causes	Types of catalysts
Macro level	social	1. political 2. economics 3. cultural	trigger events
		1. social identification 2. social interactions & group processes 3. relative deprivation	recruitment trigger events
Micro level	individual	1. psychological characteristics 2. Personal experiences	recruitment trigger Events

(Veldhuis, T. & Staun, J., 2009, p. 22)

Micro Level: Factors Within A Person That Can Affect the Radicalization Process

Factors at the individual level (micro) illustrate how differences between individuals can explain radicalization tendencies. These differences include emotions, opinions, behavior, intelligence, and other individual characteristics (Veldhuis, T. c & Staun, J., 2009, p. 53). According to Taylor & Horgan (2006, p. 586) views radicalization and involvement in terrorism as a process. This implies that psychological characteristics or individual moral qualities as the main focus influence individual behavior in acts of radicalization. In the term “individual vulnerabilities or individual vulnerabilities” refers to personal and/or environmental conditions that can cause individuals to be more vulnerable to radicalization behavior. For example, if individuals are searching for a purpose in life, radical groups can offer clear and simple answers. The ideology they pursue usually presents very important goals and clear implications for how to live up to those goals.

Meanwhile, in terms of “individual incentive(s)” refers to an individual’s attraction to violent extremism. Some of these “individual incentive(s)” include: (1) feeling an increase in social status in violent extremist groups (radicalization), (2) the attractiveness of the group identity available from radicalized groups, (3) the “sense of adventures” obtained by joining a radicalization group, (4) the desire for revenge is fulfilled by joining a radicalization group, (5) a sense of brotherhood is obtained in a radicalized group (Mattei, C., & Zeiger S., 2009).

Table 2. Individual Needs and Risk Factors

Micro Factors	
Individual Vulnerabilities	Individual Incentives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frustration from unemployment • Lack of personal identity • Detachment from country/family • Exposure to violent extremist groups in the neighborhood 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sense of acquired identity in the violent extremist group • Economic incentive provided by the group • Sense of adventure
Individual Protective Factors and Strengths	

-
- Individual “coping strategies”
 - Pro social habits
 - Strong attachment to family
-

(Mattei, C., & Zeiger S., 2009)

In a review of the literature on micro factors of radicalization, there are several prominent variables which are very important to be discussed as follows. First, the personality characteristics of the radicals. According to Victoroff (2005) it is very difficult to identify potentially vulnerable groups because there is no socio-demographic profile let alone psychological profiles of radical groups and their members. In line with Sageman (2004) and Bakker (2006) stated that radicals do not have very different psychological characteristics. Simply put, radicals appear to be no different from other people. However, other experts try to link narcissism with terrorism as a form of radicalization. According to Clayton, (1983) and Post (1998) states that narcissism is self-obsession that is mal-adaptive, excludes everyone, and the selfish and ruthless pursuit of personal gratification and ambition. Consequently, they need external enemies to blame for their own weaknesses. People with narcissistic personality traits are vulnerable to threats, because they have feelings that are difficult to predict from most other people.

Second, Personal experiences and major events in an individual’s life can contribute to radicalization. For example, radicalization and involvement in terrorism are the result of a traumatic childhood (getting treatment from an abusive family) (DeMause, 2002, p. 340). Experiences of discrimination or exclusion tend to trigger anger and aggression in individuals (Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002). In addition, social exclusion decreases pro-social behavior and increases aggressive behavior. This intuition implies that exclusion drives the urge to retaliate (Twenge et. al. 2001). According to them, suicide bombings may be a response to loss of feeling due to personal trauma and frustration. In response to that,

Third, the role of individual cognition influences their behavior (Crenshaw, 1988). Individuals with stronger closed-mindedness were found to be less tolerant of ambiguity, less open to experience, more prone to authoritarianism and dogmatism (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Simpson (2014) found that closed thinking is positively related to behavior patterns towards deviance. Certain specific conditions such as personality disorders and mental distress can trigger closed-mindedness. However, the ideology that is embedded in the mindset of individuals becomes a driving factor after the process of radicalization. Dutch psychologists Meertens, Prins and Doosje (2006) explain how people can engage in “unusual” behaviors. One of the theories used is cognitive dissonance theory. Frestinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory refers to the psychological phenomena that arise when people’s behavior conflicts with their attitudes or beliefs. One typical response to having that kind of discomfort is that more people start believing what other people are saying. For example, the more often people express radical statements the more they will begin to believe the accuracy of those statements.

Fourth, emotions are often seen as the driving force behind social behavior. Few scholars have focused explicitly on the role emotions play in aggressive or collective action. for example, it appears about hatred, contempt and urges for revenge (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Frijda, 2007). Meanwhile, according to Sarraj (2002) suggests that feelings of guilt, shame and desire for revenge are the main causes of radicalization and terrorism.

Macro Levels: Environmental Factors of the Larger Society

At the macro level, there are three relevant components to be described in more detail, namely: macro-level push factors, macro-level pull factors and community resilience mechanisms. Macro-

level drivers do not automatically lead to radicalization. Instead, these factors only create conditions of vulnerability in the social, political or cultural environment. Some driving factors at the macro level of radicalization are: (1) social marginalization in certain groups, (2) social and economic inequality, (3) lack of job opportunities, (4) injustice felt by certain ethnic or religious groups, and (5) widespread corruption (Mattei, C., & Zeiger S., 2009). The pull factor at the macro level is an “ideological” element that can influence people’s attitudes. In other words, Extremist groups tend to have certain community values to build narratives of their goals. A practical example is the ideal of a “caliphate” for the Muslim community which is underlined by several terrorist groups affiliated with armed terrorist networks (ibid., 2009). Meanwhile, community resilience refers to the quality of being able to return to its original condition after being affected by radicalization. However, resilience in the context of countering violent extremists can also mean building knowledge, skills and abilities to protect oneself from factors that can lead to radicalization. As such, community resilience mechanisms try to address community problems and social grievances. For example, through participatory community partnerships and participatory approaches in managing public affairs (Heidi B. Ellis and Saida Abdi, 2017, pp. 289-293).

Table 3. Assessing the Potential for Radicalization

Macro Push and Pull Factors	
Macro Push Factor	Macro Pull Factor
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unemployment • Lack of access to education • Ethnic of marginalization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Ideals” are distorted by violent extremist groups, such as: • Idea of the “caliphate” • Socio-economic equality
Community Resilience Mechanism	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participatory approaches in conflict resolutions • Reconciliation mechanism • Existence of public forums for discussions 	

(Mattei, C., & Zeiger S., 2009)

Discusses macro-level factors can affect individuals and how these factors contribute to radicalization. Douglas Hibbs (1973) answered that a deeply rooted macro-level structure arises because of deviant behavior and violence. Deviations can be found in individual pathology and integrate in the collective social and environmental context. For example, mass political actions and violence, the development index, as well as protests for the interests of minorities. Built on Durkheim’s concept of anomie theory and Merton’s in strain theory (Veldhuis, T. & Staun, J., 2009, p. 34) which states that the source of deviation is found in the way society is organized. Embedded in social and cultural structures are the aims and purposes of culturally determined interests. When there is a discrepancy between the goals set, an anomie situation will arise. Merton defines five modes of adaptation on how people may experience deviations (1) Conformity, (2) Innovation, (3) Ritualism, (4) Retreatism, and (5) Rebellion. Merton, like Durkheim, examines the emergence of deviant behavior from a contextual perspective. Starting from the observation that the degree of deviation varies in culture and country (Merton, 1938, p. 678). Based on Merton’s theory (in Cohen & Short, 1958), Cohen formulates in his subculture theory that shows that the inability to gain social status and acceptance can cause frustration and tension in people, often among youth (students). Due to social processes, “deviant” subcultures can emerge as a reaction to perceived

tensions. In other words, recognizing that social factors and group activities can lead to deviant behavior (radicalization).

Individuals are influenced by the environment is not a new assumption, therefore to understand how changes in behavior that occur in vulnerable groups (students) need to be understood in a social context (Veldhuis, T. & Staun, J., 2009, p. 39). In this section it is necessary to explain the fundamental processes that may be responsible for causing radicalization. First, the social identity derived from group membership allows individuals to differentiate between their own group and other groups. In other words, self-perceived group membership is very important for self-concept so that individuals feel good about themselves in their group. When social identity is prominent then it will determine how we think and act (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002). Based on the identity approach, the stronger the religious aspect of their identity, the stronger their possibility to respond to potential threats or attacks on their identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Building on social identity theory, Elliot Smith (2007) introduced the intergroup emotion theory which argues that people can experience intergroup emotions, based on judgments of conditions that do not affect them personally, but that concern other members of the group. In other words, people can experience emotions based on events in which they are not personally involved but are influenced by group members (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). the stronger they are likely to respond to potential threats or attacks on their identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Building on social identity theory, Elliot Smith (2007) introduced the intergroup emotion theory which argues that people can experience intergroup emotions, based on judgments of conditions that do not affect them personally, but that concern other members of the group. In other words, people can experience emotions based on events in which they are not personally involved but are influenced by group members (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). the stronger they are likely to respond to potential threats or attacks on their identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Building on social identity theory, Elliot Smith (2007) introduced the intergroup emotion theory which argues that people can experience intergroup emotions, based on judgments of conditions that do not affect them personally, but that concern other members of the group. In other words, people can experience emotions based on events in which they are not personally involved but are influenced by group members (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Elliot Smith (2007) introduced the intergroup emotion theory which argues that people can experience intergroup emotions, based on judgments of conditions that do not affect them personally, but that concern other members of the group. In other words, people can experience emotions based on events in which they are not personally involved but are influenced by group members (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Elliot Smith (2007) introduced the intergroup emotion theory which argues that people can experience intergroup emotions, based on judgments of conditions that do not affect them personally, but that concern other members of the group. In other words, people can experience emotions based on events in which they are not personally involved but are influenced by group members (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).

Second, radicalization occurs due to social interaction and group activities. Radicals, like other people, are embedded in a complex system of interactions that produce the circumstances in which their attitudes and behavior are formed. Their behavior is greatly influenced by interactions within the group. For example, radicals or terrorists rooted in groups can originate from spreading ideology, forming radical groups, and deviating group activities (Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1963). Friendship attachments in group interaction networks will give rise to radicalized connections in individuals (Sageman, 2004; and Bakker, 2006). Therefore, in social networks and

radical attitudes can easily develop and spread through social mechanisms and exert a strong influence on the formation of radicalization of an individual in a group.

Third, relative deprivation can trigger violence. According to Gurr (1970, p. 24) that a discrepancy between what people believe is their right and what they expect can lead to the perception of deprivation. Thus, subjectively, the inability to obtain what is felt to be justified triggers feelings of frustration which in turn facilitates the emergence of collective violence. Frustration increases the likelihood of social unrest and revolutionary moods (Davies, 1962).

Fourth, the internet is considered as a causative factor at the macro level. The advent of the internet has offered new opportunities for contact between people from different cultural, ethnic or religious backgrounds anywhere in the world. Therefore, radicalization or terrorist movements can benefit from the presence of the internet. For example, it offers easy access to general audiences, anonymity of communications, and multimedia tools for disseminating texts and videos (Weimann, 2006). Thus, the internet facilitates the emergence of virtual radical movements consisting of people who have never met but are connected through a virtual environment with the same attitudes and ideologies. To seek identity and express grievances and gain membership in a social group (Postmes & Baym, 2005, p. 31).

Vergani's View (2018)

This view is considered more comprehensive, because it is based on a systematic scoping review through examining articles in English between 2001 and 2015 concerning the factors that cause radicalization into violent extremism which are grouped into three broad categories, namely 1) push factors, 2) pull factors, and 3) personal/individual factors. The driving factors overlap with the structural root causes of terrorism that encourage people to commit violence. Attractive factors include aspects that make extremist groups and lifestyles attractive. Meanwhile, personal factors include related individual characteristics and specifically make certain individuals more vulnerable to radicalization compared to other peers.

The driving factors predominantly focus on structure, politics and sociological explanations. Dominance is cited as a condition of relative deprivation within a social group, which is defined as a condition of injustice, inequality, complaints, marginalization, social exclusion, frustration, unemployment, and political instability (in several geographic areas) (Tusini, 2019).

The pull factor focuses more on group-level sociocognitive explanations. The causes are directed at cognitive factors (consumption of extremist propaganda), social mechanisms and group processes and emotional and material incentives, such as the desire for adventure and the joy of violence. Meanwhile, personal factors are often connected to psychological explanations and individual biographies apart from push and pull factors. This factor relates to mental health and previous experiences, such as criminal behavior, substance abuse, trauma, depression, military experience and individual specific demographic characteristics (age, gender, country of birth) which subjectively make individuals more vulnerable to radical extremism (Vergani et al., 2018, p.18).

In reality, these three factors (push, pull and individual factors) are interrelated. Push factors that represent structural conditions can be the root of the emergence of pull and personal factors. As an analogy, when there is no justice and widespread poverty, it will trigger personal factors (depression and low self-esteem) as well as the beginning of the strengthening of the pull factor from the ISIS group which offers welfare and full recognition of citizenship.

Indonesian Youth Radicalism: Push, pull and personal factors

At the empirical level, the rise of youth radicalism in Indonesia is in the spotlight after many of them choose forms of acts of violence in the form of terrorism to represent their political identity (Azca, 2013, p. 17). At least through the theoretical framework built on the two views above, in particular the perspective developed by Vergani (et al., 2018), it can be identified that there are at least three main factors that cause radicalism in Indonesia's young generation. There are push, pull and personal factors.

First, the driving factors that focus on the structure, politics and historical sociological explanations of the Indonesian nation. Starting from the post-New Order point of analysis, as a period of transition from authoritarian command to true democracy. Shows two main things that underlie the rise of radicalism in young people at that time, namely 1) the emergence of political turmoil and great social dynamics in society and 2) the transformation of the radical Islamic movement which metamorphosed from the radical movement at the beginning of independence (Azca, 2014, p. 17). The existing political turmoil was strengthened by the empirical condition of the nation which was in the form of uncertainty/uncertainty in life, this can be identified by several facts, where the unemployment rate for Indonesian youth at that time was around 72, 5% come from young people (Hassan, N., 2010, p. 49), high inflation rates, accumulating foreign debt and very obvious inequality (Kompas.com, 2021). Until the climax, namely the monetary crisis in 1998 which overthrew Suharto's power.

On top of these conditions, it triggers the emergence of a second factor, namely personal (focusing on psychological and biographical characteristics of individuals) who are depressed, depressed, afraid, to the uncertainty of life. Requires conditions of vulnerability in facing radicalism attacks. This vulnerability is also caused by the psychological transitional phase of young people who are more susceptible to experiencing an identity crisis that is triggered by "identity action" (Marranci, 2006), and are prone to experiencing "cognitive opening" which brings young people closer to ideas and new thoughts that are more radical (Azca, 2013, p. 19). In this phase they work to understand who they are and how they relate to society (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Atkins & Hart, 2003).

On the other hand, this condition strengthens the position of the third factor, namely the attraction that makes extremist groups attractive for young people to follow. Through an alternative and simple ideological explanation of the problems faced by individuals. Extremist groups often fulfill certain fundamental social and psychological needs (Bjorgo, 2012). Through the use of language and symbols that place radical claims within a certain interpretive framework, they thus struggle for Frame alignment or alignment of their narrative with the existing perceptions and complaints of the target group/population (Pauwels et al., 2014, p. 28). In other words, extremist groups can be attractive to individuals who are in a position of frustration, uncertainty, depression because they are able to offer answers to all existing questions and problems. This condition is exacerbated by the rapid development of technology and communication. Which is used by radical-theorist groups to quickly spread ideas to recruit new cadres in extremist directions

Based on this, it is actually an important note that radicalism will always be present when political, social and economic conditions are unstable. Triggering vulnerability to individual psychology and strengthening individuals/groups to seek various alternative ideological choices through moral abandonment to other values that are better able to answer questions/problems and provide moral guarantees and well-being.

Radicalization Model

Terrorism is the result of a process of radicalization in stages that occurs in “normal” people (Moghaddam, 2005; Schbid, 2016). People who radicalize form a central element which is shown in three phases during the radicalization process, (1) the sensitivity phase, (2) the group membership phase, and (3) the action phase. All of these phases depend on the level of radicalization factors, namely micro or macro (Doosje, et. al., 2016).

Phase 1 Radicalization: sensitization (sensitivity)

In the first phase at the micro level, the factors within a person that can influence this process are those involving the search for identity/feelings (Kruglanski et. al., 2104; Weber et. al., 2001). Feelings of worthlessness can be caused by loss of status, humiliation, poor career prospects, and others. Radical groups are equipped with the good intentions and goals to foster or restore feelings of worth by giving members of radical groups a sense of belonging, respect, status, and ideas to further their goals (Doosje, et. al., 2016, p. 7). The second driving factor in this phase at the micro level is individual uncertainty. When people feel uncertain, they become motivated to identify strongly with groups that can reduce their uncertainty by providing clear norms and values (Hogg et. al., 2013). This is in line with The Uncertainty Reduction Theory which shows that individuals who experience uncertainty will be attracted to groups/entities that can reduce their uncertainty (Kaishauri, G., 2021, p.11). Radicalist groups provide this certainty, because they have clear profiles, offer a solid structure and a worldview that makes individuals feel confident to join radical groups.

At the meso level, the process of radicalization is influenced by the social environment (friends, family and other groups). In this phase there is a feeling of injustice that people experience when they identify with their group and they feel that their group is treated worse than other groups (Crosby, 1976). For example, individuals in this case experience social and economic disparities (education, employment and income) (Feddes AR, 2013). In addition, they experience discrimination and are treated badly by their group (society). (Doosje et.al., 2016). Thus, radical groups give individuals a sense of belonging to the group and provide fulfillment of their basic needs.

Then, other things at the macro level, the process of radicalization is partly influenced by factors of accelerating globalization and world threats due to western political, economic and cultural domination (Moghaddam, 2005). For example, the influence of a westernized lifestyle is a cultural threat, so this becomes a threat to radical groups and triggers terrorism.

Phase 2 Radicalization: group membership

In the second phase, the individual joins a radical group which shows shared commitment as a core of the process of radicalization. Individuals become very attached to the group. At the micro level, a person begins as a marginal member, and is motivated to show loyalty to the group. Thus, this person tends to follow group norms and values, for example by demeaning outsiders in a public context (Noel, 1995).

At the meso level, it can be identified through physical and psychological isolation that separates the individual from his old environment. Another process that occurs at this level is coaching and training activities in it.

Meanwhile, at the macro level, in this phase, the bonds between individuals and radical groups are strengthened, besides that physical and psychological isolation occurs so that individuals can separate from their old social environment. Most importantly, in this phase, group members are encouraged to cut ties with friends and family who are not members of the radical group. This

makes the internal group more cohesive and strong (Swam, et.al., 2012). Another thing at the macro level, global political influence that creates extremist groups in various parts of the world to show their power and strength to the world (Ginges et. al., 2011).

Phase 3 Radicalization: action

In this final phase, marked the use of violence committed by individuals or groups against other groups (society). This condition is not an easy one, simply because the encouragement that arises from the micro to macro level ultimately makes it more difficult for them to retreat. By presenting outside groups as a form of threat to radical groups, they justify violence against outside groups (Slike, 1998).

One of the most widely used phase models to identify radicalization is the model "top-down" used by the Danish Intelligence Service (PET). The PET phase model distinguishes degrees or stages of the radicalization process, where people will become increasingly radicalized as more stages are passed. The process starts with becoming an individual who is "vulnerable" to radical ideas and encounters with radical groups, and progresses to practice and behavior change. Furthermore, the process involves narrowing the circle of friends and family and results in a (violent) action phase which includes interest in atrocity videos featuring terrorists in combat and killings (PET, 2009).

Table 4. Danish Intelligence Service (PET) phase model

Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4
Contact between a radicalizer and someone who is open to radical ideas	Gradual change of behavior changes and habits	Narrowing of social life (family and friends), with only those of the same minded group	The process of hardening morals and showing an interest in violence

(PET, 2009)

The second widely used model was developed by the New York City Police Department (NYPD), which differentiates it from the previous four PET phases. The NYPD model is called the "bottom-up" model which focuses on radicalization as a process (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Figure 5: NYPD Phase Model

Pre-radicalization	Self identification	Indoctrination	Jihadization
The starting point of departure from the previous life of the individual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - This second phase depicts individuals gradually opening up new interpretations of the world and starting to explore radical Islam. - Extremist ideologies are identified and old identities are gradually lost. - Individuals are increasingly exclusive, because they associate with those who have the same thoughts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In this phase the individual completely adopts an “extremist” ideology and concludes that this ideology is necessary to fight against all that is contrary. - Full acceptance of extremism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In this phase, the individual has the responsibility to participate in extreme missions. - requires self-appointment and accepting the assignment of radical groups to initiate actual involvement in violence. - in the jihadization phase, planning, preparation and execution of violence or terrorist attacks are the main goals

(Silber & Bhatt, 2007)

Although the PET and NYPD models aim to capture a gradual chronology of radicalization, they differ in several aspects. First, in the NYPD model, the process of radicalization is somewhat longer than in the PET model, because it starts before people become radicalized. It is necessary to emphasize that radicals are not psychopaths or madmen, but normal people who have misled themselves. In addition, the two different models view radicalization as a top-down process (PET) and a bottom-up process (NYPD). On the one hand, the PET model emphasizes the role of radicalization from outsiders, while the NYPD model emphasizes cognitive factors or personal crises that are vulnerable to the process of radicalization (PET, 2009; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Conclusion

Based on the explanation above, a simple conclusion can be put forward that radicalism among students in the post-New Order period until now can occur due to three main factors, namely push, pull and personal factors. Unstable political, social and economic conditions, as well as the

mobilization of radical Islamic movements are the driving factors for the rise of radicalism among young people. On the other hand, such conditions trigger an increase in the second factor, namely individuals who are faced with uncertain conditions, depression, distrust which pave the way for the third factor, namely extremist groups become attractive for young people to follow. Through an alternative and simple ideological explanation of the problems faced by individuals. Then the radicalization model consists of phases that gradually contribute to the formation of individual radicalization processes. In other words, individual has personal responsibility for being radical or terrorist. It can start from spreading ideology, forming radical groups, and deviant activities. This plays an important role in relation to the process of radicalization from thought to action (terrorist).

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