

# Hegemony of Trump: Manifestation of Islamophobia in an inaugural speech

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## ABSTRACT

In some publications, it has been observed that media proliferation promotes the negative views on Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremism, or Islamic terrorism. These discourses have contributed to worsening tension in different sociocultural contexts such as between the West and Islam, which is commonly known as *Islamophobia*. The discourse around islamophobia has become an implied tool to construct hegemony such as reflected in a political pretext to show attitude and view of the dominant power. The present study offers an insight from the perspective of critical discourse analysis to understand the discourse around islamophobia. Using the principles of Fairclough's (1989) Critical Discourse Analysis with its three dimensions: text, discursive practice, and social practice, the study adapted a two-stage analysis model to describe and interpret a section of Trump's inaugural speech that seems to be contradictory as it mentions a reflection of islamophobia amidst the promotion of peace. The result of the study shows that Trump's islamophobia is implied in the part of an inaugural speech as a content related to Islam and terrorism. Relevant to the intention of the speech given to the Indian audience, the observed section of the speech is probably not misplaced; instead, reflects Trump's view on Islam and terrorism as well as his dominance.

**Keywords:** CDA; dominance; Fundamentalism; hegemony; Islamophobia

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## INTRODUCTION

Much of the discourse on Islamic fundamentalism has been widely associated with various Muslim organizations and figures, becoming a new stigma, replacing the old one created by classical orientalism. Moallem (2005) signalled that fundamentalism has become a new weapon of the West to continue discrediting Islam. The term Islamic fundamentalism is blurred when it is interpreted as violence, terrorism, extremism, or jihad (Gunderson, 2004, p. 1). The relationship that

is built then is that Islam is synonymous with violence, creating what is known as Islamophobia.

To reflect on the historical account, fundamentalism is a religious term born from the Christian religious tradition. According to Marsden (2006), fundamentalism is attributed to several schools of Christianity, such as the Presbyterian Church, Evangelicalism, and Baptism. They are opposed to modernism and the modern culture shaped by modernists. They were also anti-science and anti-intellectual, and they banned the teaching

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of Darwin's theory of evolution in schools at that time. For them, the theory of evolution had caused a spiritual and cultural crisis and undermined the Biblical foundation of American civilization (p. 20). They also offer rigid, fanatical, and intolerant religious views that understand religion as a series of dead and rigid dictums and are obsessed with forcing others to follow their group (Madjid, 1997, p. 166). Theologically, fundamentalists believe that Christianity is a religion whose contents are directly received from Christ and his apostles, so that it is a final and absolute religion (Dann, 2008, p. 6).

In its early days, Christian fundamentalism was recognized through the publication of a periodical entitled *The Fundamental: A Testimony to the Truth* that appeared between 1910 and 1915 and continued with the conferences of the World Association of Fundamental Christians in 1919 (Eisenstadt & Aizenshtadt, 1999, p. 5). They were intended to defend the faith against the liberal and progressive spirit of the modernization process (Bruce, 2008, p. 81).

The problem then is that the term fundamentalism, which originated in the Christian world, is applied to the Islamic world. The resonance of the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism originated from the phenomenon of the 'Iranian Revolution' by Imam Khomeini in 1979 (Frey, 2007, p. 95), but when the 9/11 tragedy that hit the American WTC twin buildings broke out, this phenomenon was also referred to as the phenomenon of Islamic Fundamentalism (Barkun, 2013, p. 57). Islam creates more contemporary fundamentalist movements than any other religion and presents an inherently intolerant and extreme Islam (Appleby, 1999, p. 104). On the other hand, the term Islamic fundamentalism is often aligned with terms that have negative meanings, such as terrorism. Bar (2008) calls international Islamic terrorism a natural offshoot of 20th-century Islamic fundamentalism. He then cited the Muslim Brotherhood as the most fundamentalist movement. This is because the Muslim Brotherhood has a project of "re-Islamization" of Muslim society and the restoration of Islamic government based on Islamic law. Jihad is directed against "apostate" Muslim governments and societies (Bar, 2008, pp. 12-13; Haynes, 2007, p. 54).

The preliminary observation in this study included an observation that there had been a phenomenon that tended to negatively view the Islamic World. For example, media proliferation would promote the negative views presented in the media publications and academic articles on Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremism, or Islamic terrorism. These discourses have greatly contributed to worsening tension between Muslims and non-Muslims in many different sociocultural contexts such as between the West and Islam, which is commonly known as Islamophobia. The discourse

around Islamophobia has become an implied tool to construct hegemony and dominance or a political pretext to show power. With this consideration, the present study offers an insight from the perspective of critical discourse analysis to understand the discourse around Islamophobia. The specific observation, however, is focused on the manifestation of Islamophobia as found in the speech of former United States president, Donald Trump, at The Namaste, Trump Event in Ahmedabad, India, on February 24, 2020. The study offers a review on the the discourse around Islamophobia in his speech and explains how the discourse shows a characteristic of a hegemony that contributes to the domination of the West against Islam in general. Implications of the study includes a critical review of the previous studies on the similar topic areas.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The study is an investigation into a section of speech given by Trump during his visit to India. In doing so, it uses the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1989). This principle provides a framework to help understand language and its surrounding sociocultural context around its use.

Language is interpreted not only as a means of communication but also as a way to manifest certain instrument of power. CDA is seen as a method to deal with research in relation to the use of language in particular social and cultural situations (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In the similar vein, Wodak (2015) stated that CDA investigates language use beyond the sentence level, aiming to deconstruct the roles of discourses in the imbalance of structures and challenges the social conditions in which they are embedded. According to Van Dijk (2015), CDA facilitates an analysis by providing a critical perspective in all areas of discourse studies, it gives a clear direction when used with other tools such as narrative analysis, conversation analysis or sociolinguistics. Moreover, in terms of power, Van Dijk (1997) stated that CDA is useful as a tool to delve into the representation of power and dominance that are associated with specific social domain. Considering these, the study uses CDA as the main analytical tool for the data analysis.

When addressing the cultural components of social life, such as when control and exploitation are sustained through culture and ideology, CDA is regarded an application of critical analysis of language inspired by Marxism (Watherell et al., 2001). In line with this, a perspective of hegemony has a great influence on CDA because, it helps to see ideology as something that is not abstract but as part of concrete activities and social praxis. So, language becomes the foundation of the ideological subject (Watherell et al., 2001). Among the many critical ideas of CDA is that of the Frankfurt School,

namely that cultural processes have an impact on social life and are the sphere of struggle against domination and help emancipation (Wiggershaus, 1994). This will be accounted for in the study. Since the study focuses on the data containing statement of Islamophobia, an account of Islamic fundamentalism is also reviewed.

***Stigmatization of Islamic Fundamentalism: From Religious Violence to Terrorism***

Milton-Edwards (2013) explained that Islamic fundamentalism has been identified as a style of textual understanding of faith and practice that underlies religious purification movements (p. 3). The study examined the purification movement of Moammad ibn Abd. al-Wahhb (1703–1792), who fought against deviations in Islam and called on believers to follow only fundamental doctrines. Then, Zeidan (2018) emphasizes that Islamic fundamentalism may be characterized by the implementation of Islamic Sharia law where Sayyid Qutb's concepts of hikmiyah and Rabbniyah are considered as forerunners of fundamentalism. They view Islamic teachings as a legal system that is mandatory for contemporary society, while the government is a stepping stone to implementing religious law (pp. 279-280). In another light, Fuller (2002) defines 'Islamic fundamentalism' as individuals who accept the Quran literally, adhere to the Prophet's traditions, believe in ultimate truth, and are intolerant of others (p. xii). Fuller is more inclined to use the term "Islamism" or "political Islam" for Muslims who have ideas, thoughts, and movements that highlight Islamic and societal issues.

Elsewhere, scholars of Islam such as Esposito (2003) is selective in the use of the term 'Islamic fundamentalism'. He tends to use the terms 'Islamic Revival' and 'Islamist' for religious movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, that have succeeded in building a more Islamic society. They exist in almost all walks of life, such as psychologists, journalists, lawyers, and political scientists. Their activities are spread across many institutions, such as Islamic schools, health clinics, hospitals, social services, and publishing houses. They emerge as a response to state failure and societal crises when there is no effective leadership in the country (p. 74). The use of the term 'Islamic fundamentalism', as in his other work, *The Future of Islam*, is limited to 'Wahhabi Islam' and 'Salafi Islam'. To highlight the difference from Christianity, Tibi (2002) defines Islamic fundamentalism as a distinct group that has nothing to do with Islam. For him, this is a threat to global politics, security, and stability. Their movement is an aggressive politicization of religion in order to attain non-religious ends (p. xi).

As a movement, Islamic fundamentalism is fighting the secularism of the infidel West.

Therefore, the goal of the West's war against Islam must be to drive out Islamic fundamentalism. Fighting Islam does not mean replacing Islam with Western religion but forcing Islam to lay down its arms and accept the freedom of secular society (Tracinski, 2001), with Qub as an example of the rise of Sunni Muslim extremism (Appleby, 1999; Borzutzky & Berger, 2010, p. 91). Further, Appleby (1999) provides an explanation of Qub's typology of fundamentalism, that indicates all the elements of a fundamentalist ideological pattern. To this, Thomas (2010) states that Islamic fundamentalism is seen by Western scholars as an incarnation of the rottenness of the Afterlife, namely fanaticism, in which the teaching of violence abounds (p. 664).

In a number of research, Iranian Revolution has been quoted as a phenomenon that is considered as a manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism (Marty & Appleby, 2004, pp. 417-418; Milton-Edwards, 2013, pp. 82-110). However, the Iranian Revolution spearheaded by Ayatollah Khomeini was a form of protest against Western activities in the Islamic World or the development of Western culture in the Islamic World. Likewise, Esposito and Voll (2001) saw Iranian Revolution as an important phenomenon in the context of the Islamic revival. It was the culmination of the uncertain welfare conditions of the Iranian people as a result of strong foreign interference in Iran (p. 67). However, Milton-Edwards (2006) saw the Iranian Revolution as a negative religious movement and phenomenon. Unlike Esposito (2003), who reveals the positive side of the Iranian Revolution, Milton-Edwards (2006) and Appleby (1999) placed the Iranian Revolution in the frame of terrorism and a threat to the West. For Milton-Edwards (2006), the idea of "Islam as a threat" can be seen in the phenomenon of the Iranian Revolution, which had a goal to set global dominance for the Islamic State led by the clerics. Further, Milton-Edwards (2006) did not reject the general Western view that Islam is a destructive force and a backward and barbaric faith system (p. 56).

Other research, for example one by Ruthven (2004) identifies the phenomenon of Jamaluddin Afghani as Islamic fundamentalism as it had radical family resemblances, wishing to return to the pure roots of Islam, and mobilizing the Muslim rulers of his time against British imperialism (p. 27). In another sense, Watt (2013) limits the meaning of the term Islamic fundamentalism to a tendency to hold on to traditional values and a vision of the past rather than an orientation to the future; therefore, Islamic fundamentalism is a symbol of the backwardness of Islam and Muslims (pp. 5 & 12).

In the contemporary era, Wahabism is often associated with acts of violence and terrorism. Some authors attribute Wahabi influence to Osama bin Laden's actions on 9/11. Behnam Bahari and Mehdi Bakhshi Sheikh Ahmad stated that there was a

combination of Wahabism, Qutbism, and al-Qaeda in 9/11, which he later called "Neo-Wahabism". Bahari also connects the Neo-Wahabism event with Western-centric terminology such as holy war (Bahari & Ahmad, 2014, pp. 20-23). However, this view is refuted by H. J. Oliver, who states that the analogy that equates Osama bin Laden with a Wahabi is a fatal mistake because the analogy is based on Osama bin Laden's birthplace in Saudi Arabia (Oliver, 2002, p. 7).

Tibi (2002) is one among the experts that equate Islamic fundamentalism with terrorism. Citing the jihadist ideology created by Bann and Qub, Tibi (2002) calls these two figures the intellectuals of terrorism. The 9/11 tragedy has revived the term Islamic fundamentalism that was previously pinned on the phenomenon of the Iranian Revolution. The 9/11 tragedy has given a new face to 'Islamic fundamentalism' as 'Islamic terrorism'. Maryam Jahedi and Faiz Sathi Abdullah mentioned that the discourse that developed after the 9/11 tragedy, especially in major American media such as The New York Times, had dragged Islamic fundamentalism as terrorism, and more than that, Iran was said to be the cause of the 9/11 tragedy (Jahedi & Abdullah, 2012, p. 68). The impact of 9/11 is the concern of European countries such as France about the penetration of Islamic fundamentalism in their countries, along with the increase in the population of Muslim communities in Europe and the memory of the Iranian Revolution (Amin, 2013, p. 19). In relation to 9/11, Western media have created stereotypes by linking terrorism with the phenomenon of hijab, the activity of performing congregational prayers in public spaces, as Islamic fundamentalism (Hirji, 2011, p. 35). According to Poole, Islamic fundamentalism is still a representation of terrorism in the 9/11 tragedy. In this context, Islamic fundamentalism is depicted as the hatred of preachers and anti-Americanism (Poole, 2011, p. 35).

The discourse construct of Islamic fundamentalism imagines a representation of ugliness and darkness. Grosfoguel (2009) states that this discourse is classified as a discourse of Eurocentrism that exalts and glorifies the West on the one hand and denigrates non-Westerners on the other (p. 98). Islamic fundamentalism, portrayed as religious violence, anti-Westernism, terrorism, and a threat to the West, is a problematic conceptualization and analysis of contemporary Western scholars (Funk, 2007, p. 30). It is very likely that behind the creation of these bad images in the discourse of 'Islamic fundamentalism' lies a certain intention, as Barbir and Sha'ban (1994) once stated that the Western interpretation of the East or Islam usually leads to the creation of the new world order', as an order that is in accordance with what the West wants (pp. 1421-1422).

### ***Hegemony and Domination Constructs in the Discourse of Islamic Fundamentalism***

This study argues that any amount of language, terminology, mention, and a discourse is seen as having sufficient content that is believed to have an implicit purpose and has implications for social reality. This includes the use of Islamic fundamentalism in political speeches that may lead to Islamophobia. A theory of hegemony states that dominance can include the shaping of our daily lives, our feelings and ideas, and the slogans of the women's movement, in which case language is crucial in the context of how we interpret the world and create meaning (Ives, 2004, pp. 70-71). So, language is related to hegemony or becomes a tool for it (Gramsci, 1971, p. 451). Through this theory, Islamic fundamentalism can be understood as a language used by certain parties (the West, for example) to hegemonize and dominate others (in this case, Muslims).

Western domination of Islam is often exercised through the propagation of stereotypes about Islamic societies and women in the world media (Gugler, 2010, pp. 3-4). Winegar (2008) also mentions that hegemony is created by first associating and making an event a representation of a culture and religion, which in this case is always identified as Islam. The way this is done is by taking a particular form of broad and diverse cultural production and characterizing it as "Middle Eastern" or "Islamic". This use of representation recreates, as Orientalism did, the homogeneity of regional, religious, cultural, and historical realities. Although many experts and scholars are eager to erase the stereotypes created by the drive for generalization, they cannot escape the general framework that has come to dominate. This is because funders (the political powers that be) want these facts to be referred to as "Middle Eastern" or "Islamic" (p. 655). All of this is the reason why discourse is increasingly used as an instrument of hegemony.

Dependence on the West in the context of issues deliberately raised by the West will further strengthen the West's position in dominating and hegemonizing Islam. Turner (2002) adds that in the perspective of Foucault's analysis of knowledge, we have been biased in typologies whose traits can be distributed, for example, the energetic Westerner versus the lustful Easterner, the rational Westerner versus the unpredictable Easterner, and the 'gentle' white man versus the vile yellow man (p. 58). In addition, Kepel (2009) states that the discourse of terrorism (and fundamentalism) is a frame created to make Islam the main cause of terrorism as well as a threat to Western hegemony over the whole world. Finally, the image that is built among Europeans is that Islam has been reduced to extremism and death threats (p. 213).

The discourse of Islamic fundamentalism has positioned the West at the pinnacle of power. The

term Islamic fundamentalism, with all its parameters, is a hegemonic discourse that legitimizes Western dominance. Through the discourse of the "Islamic threat" to the West after 9/11, America exercised dominance over the international system (Hossain, 2012, p. 293). Similarly, when the United States rolled out the idea of "the world risk society," which then changed American foreign policy, According to Keyman (2010), with this idea, the United States implemented a neo-conservative ideology of power and dominance (Keyman, 2010, p. 6). The 'war on terror' discourse is a continuation of the instrument to carry out the mission of hegemony and dominance (Noor, 2010, p. 52). In line with the above view, Ayoola and Olaosun (2014) mentioned that the American view that Al-Qaeda used Nigeria as a base to attack the West cannot be confirmed, especially given the fact that what happened was the dominance of power by America, Britain, and France (p. 55).

Racialized expressions that glorify one race over another are seen by Craiutu (2010) as the role of orientalism. It signifies that the East is evil and oppressive, which is propaganda deliberately created for political purposes, hegemony, and dominance (p. 268). Florig's (2010) study states that one example of successful American hegemony is the American occupation of Iraq. The occupation has succeeded in determining a ruling regime that favors American interests. However, this domination is considered to trigger a greater surge of Islamic fundamentalism in an effort to respond to this domination (pp. 111-112). This is in contrast to Iran, where the Iranian Revolution and Iran's foreign policy show Iran's resistance to American domination (Karimifard, 2012, p. 244). Religion (Islamism) played a very significant role in the formation and strengthening of Iran's national identity. All this clarified the boundaries of culture and religion to make Iran a strong and independent country that is difficult to dominate by the political interests of other countries (Shahramnia & Tadayon, 2012, p. 311).

There is an important statement from Turner (2002), i.e., all forms of language that create fundamental categories of similarities and differences and their applications are a form of dominance (pp. 57-58). From this perspective, the creation of the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism is a form of Western power or domination over Islam. The discourse of Islamic fundamentalism is shaped in such a way as to foster other social symptoms, such as Islamophobia. The West, in turn, will offer concepts, ideologies, paradigms, and methodologies to stem Islamic fundamentalism. The themes that Muslim women live in backwardness and are confined to patriarchal culture are a

hegemony so that Muslim women can adopt colonial capitalist culture (Nasser et al., 2010, p. 153).

In the context of domination, Crosston (2016) suggests that the resonance of the 'Islamic fundamentalist-terrorist' discourse is aimed at the quest for American global supremacy. To achieve the full spectrum of domination, various policies are directed towards hegemony efforts (p. 3). Baker (2012) also assesses the existence of American imperial interests or projects in the depiction of Islamist groups, or the "Islamist Imaginary" (p. 540). Weismann (2011) considers that the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism is a hegemonic discourse that aims to make Muslims abandon adherence to their religious texts and accept the practices of modernity (p. 146). Van Santen (2010) mentions that some Muslim modernists who are influenced by this hegemonic discourse seek to socialize Western culture so that they are not referred to as non-universal (p. 288). If the control of the discourse on Islamic fundamentalism has strengthened in the midst of Muslims, then the maker of this discourse will more easily direct, control, and determine the direction of the social, cultural, and political life of Muslims. Western interests in many dimensions will be easily realized in Muslim societies that have previously been controlled or dominated.


## **METHOD**

As noted, the main data for this study is Donald Trump's speech, at The Namaste, Trump Event in Ahmedabad, India, on February 24, 2020. One of the rationales for the selection of the speech as the main data was the fact that while the speech was given in India with a focus of discussing cooperative projects between the US and India, there was a part of the speech that talked about Islam and terrorism. This part of the speech was a 2-minute section taken from the total of around 30-minute speech. The text is transcribed for the video and analysed using Critical Discourse Analysis.

The primary methodology used in the data analysis process is that of Norman Fairclough's (1989) CDA with its three dimensions: text, discursive practice, and social practice. In its original model, Fairclough (1989) suggested that the first analysis is conducted on detailing the text, followed by the second analysis, which examine the discursive practices of the text that includes the production and interpretation for the processing analysis. Then, the third analysis is focused on the entwining social practice into the larger social and cultural aspects (ibid). An adaptive model is employed in the data analysis process of the present study, conflated into a simple analysis consisting of two stages (Figure 1).

**Figure 1**

Adapted discourse analysis model for data analysis



In the first stage of the analysis process, the text is described by detailing the expressions, for example the lexical choices, the sentence structure and the tenses. Then, focusing on a specific 2-minute section of the speech, the analysis carried on by carefully analyzing its placement within the inaugural speech. This means that at the text level analysis, the speech section was analyzed in relation to its relevance with the previous and subsequent part of the speech sections. Interpretation is then made based on the discourse practice, that is the elaboration of the production and interpretation of the speech as it was originally functioned to be a part of the inaugural speech. This analysis includes how the speech was presented in front of Indian audience. The second stage of analysis will be useful to understand the social and cultural practice in which the speech was spoken. Therefore, the result of the analysis on these parts will be summarized and synthesized to produce an overall sociocultural role overview of the inclusion of the islamophobia statement in the inaugural speech.

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The result of the study reveals an important finding, i.e., the reflection of Trump's islamophobia which is somehow misplaced in a speech given as an inaugural speech. The mere mention of a content related to Islam and terrorism implied the speaker's, in this case Trump, attitude and view on islamophobia. The fact that the content was a part of an inaugural speech for the promotion of peace in India, the content is contradictory to the purpose of the speech in general.

### Trump's Speech in India as a hegemony discourse

At the first stage of the analysis, a section of speech is identified, then analyzed in details. As noted, the analysis was focused on a specific 2-minute section of the speech. Excerpt 1 shows the particular section found from minutes 17.44 to 19.52 of Trump's speech.

#### Excerpt 1:

The United States and India are also firmly united in our ironclad resolve to defend our citizens from the threat of radical Islamic terrorism. Both of our countries have been hurt by the pain and turmoil of terrorism and that terrorism brings. Under my

administration, we unleashed the full power of the American military on bloodthirsty killers of ISIS in Iraq and in Syria. Today, the ISIS territorial caliphate has been 100 percent destroyed. And the monster known as al-Baghdadi, the founder and leader of ISIS, is dead. In the United States, we have also made clear that while our country will always welcome newcomers who share our values and love our people, our borders will always be closed to terrorists and terrorism and to any form of extremism. That is why we have taken historic steps to improve screening and vetting of applications for entry, and we are working to ensure that anyone who threatens the security of our citizens is denied admission and will pay a very, very big, costly price. Every nation has the right to secure and controlled borders. The United States and India are committed to working together to stop terrorists and to fight their ideology. For this reason, since taking office, my administration is working in a very positive way with Pakistan to crack down on the terrorist organizations and militants that operate on the Pakistani border (PBS NewsHour, 2017).

In the first stage of the analysis process, the text is described by detailing the expressions, for example the lexical choices, the sentence structure and the tenses. In terms of lexical choices, words such as *Islam*, *fundamentalist*, *radical*, *extremist*, *terrorism*, and *ISIS* were found. The word *terrorism* and its variation, *terrorist* was pronounced up to 12 times in such a short excerpt. The lexical choices clearly refer to Islam with its negative associations. These lexical choices were also collocated with other negative connotations such as *threat*, *monster*, *killer*, and *bloodthirsty*, giving an impression that Islam is a dangerous entity.

Further analysis on the sentence structure found that the types of verbs used differ, depending on the subject of the sentence. When the sentences use subjects such as *The United States and India* or *both of our countries*, the verbs found are *in our ironclad resolve*, *have been hurt*, and *working together*. These choices establish the positions of the United States and India as mutual collaborators. However, in the next part of this sentence, they are followed by object phrases such as *the threat of radical Islamic terrorism*, *the pain and turmoil of terrorism*, and *to stop terrorists and to fight their ideology*, which presume the situation and condition as though Islam has caused serious there are some dangers hence, they need to be diminished.

In other expressions, the sentences use subjects that refer to Trump or his representations in pronouns such as *we*. By using this pronoun, Trump identifies himself as belonging to the United States and speak on behalf of the country. Elsewhere, adverbs such as *under my administration* and *in the United States*, implying that an action was conducted by Trump as mandated upon his position as a president of the United States which gives him the authority to command certain movement. With these subjects, verbs of sentences are found as *unleashed the full power of the American military*, *welcome newcomers who share our values and love our people*, and *ensure that anyone who threatens the security of our citizens is denied admission and will pay a very, very big, costly price*. These verbs explicitly showing that as a president trump has power to move the American military and to impose a serious consequence upon foreseeable threats to the country.

It is important to note that the main excerpt used as the main data was a part of the longer, more complete inaugural speech. Therefore, the meaning carried through the main excerpt is dependent on the previous and subsequent parts relevant to the main excerpt. To the purpose of the analysis, five sentences are taken from the previous part (Excerpt 2) and another five from the subsequent part (Excerpt 3).

#### **Excerpt 2:**

We make the best and we're dealing now with India. But this includes advanced air defense systems and armed and unarmed aerial vehicles. **And I am pleased to announce that tomorrow our representatives will sign deals to sell over three billion dollars in the absolute finest state-of-the-art military helicopters and other equipment to the Indian Armed Forces.** I believe that the United States should be India's premier defense partner, and that's the way it's working out. Together, we will defend our sovereignty, security, and protect a free and open Indo-Pacific region for our children and for many, many generations to come.

Excerpt 2, which is taken from the previous part of the Main Excerpt, provides information on the motivation on the rationale for the mention of statements related to Islam and terrorism. In this excerpt contains a statement: *And I am pleased to announce that tomorrow our representatives will sign deals to sell over three billion dollars in the absolute finest state-of-the-art military helicopters and other equipment to the Indian Armed Forces.* This expression reveals the intention of the US President in his visit to India back in 2020. It can be inferred from this statement that the US visit was intended for a trade deal, which is further reinforced in Excerpt 3.

#### **Excerpt 3:**

India has an important leadership role to play in shaping a better future as you take on greater responsibility for solving problems and promoting

peace throughout this incredible region. **Over the course of my visit, Prime Minister Modi and I will also discuss our efforts to expand the economic ties between our two countries. We will be making very, very major, among the biggest ever made, trade deals.** We are in the early stages of discussion for an incredible trade agreement to reduce barriers of investment between the United States and India, and I am optimistic that working together, the Prime Minister and I can reach a fantastic deal that's good and even great for both of our countries. Except that he's a very tough negotiator.

Excerpts 3 adds to the information that enhances the intention of trade deals between The United States and India. It contains the statement: *Over the course of my visit, Prime Minister Modi and I will also discuss our efforts to expand the economic ties between our two countries. We will be making very, very major, among the biggest ever made, trade deals.*

Now it is clear that the overall speech is presented for the purpose of a trade deal between the United States and India. What remains a question now is the significance of the inclusion of Islam and terrorism in the main excerpt (Excerpt 1), i.e., why it is necessary to mention them amidst the intention of making a trade deal. At this point, the analysis continues to draw an interpretation based on the texts analysed into its discursive practice.

In the discursive practice, the elaboration is made based on the production and interpretation of the text. In this case, the speech was originally functioned as an inaugural speech during Trump's visit to India in 2020. Therefore, it is clear that the speech was delivered by Trump as the speaker towards Indian audience as the recipient of the speech.

In the speech, Trump addressed the host country by talking about the country of India with its positive attributes using the words and phrases such as harmony, peaceful, special, democratic, independent, tolerant, freedom, liberty, individual rights, and the dignity of every human being. Many of these words have been uttered before discussing the issue of Islam. Then, it is found that the speech mentioned praises for the Indian leader, Modi in the early part of the speech. Trump called him an Indian leader who managed to make the country better by reducing poverty and unemployment, successful development in small areas, and several other praises. As the host country, India has been praised since the beginning of the speech with Trump's emphasis on the relationship between the United States and India through the phrase namely *America loves India, America respects India, and America will always be faithful and loyal friends to the Indian people.*

Then, it becomes interesting to understand the inclusion of Islam and its association with the terrorism within the speech. The text analysis shows

that while India and its leader was praised with positive attribution, the part of the text that discussed Islam was mentioned with negative connotations. Trump speech in the event was a reminder for the Indian audience that fundamentalist Islam, which was often associated with terrorism, extremism, and radicalism, is a problem and a major threat to the Indian state, which is actually peaceful, developed, harmonious, and has good leaders.

With Islam considered a problem, Trump provides support for the rights of a country to defend its sovereignty and security from the Islam in question. This is the point where his mention about terrorism by fundamentalist Islam was relevant that is motivated by the United States' intention to sell their military equipment to India. With the rationale to promote peace and solve problems in both India and the United States, the mention of terrorism was probably considered necessary to show the quality of the United States' military system while it was being offered to India through the inaugural speech.

#### **Overview of the sociocultural context: Manifestation of islamophobia in an inaugural speech**

In the second stage of the analysis the focus is given to the overall sociocultural aspects that motivate the manifestation of Trump's attitudes and his view upon Islamophobia as reflected in the Excerpt 1. In the sociocultural context, the text of Trump's speech on Islam can be interpreted as a way to attract the sympathy of the Indian state in order to launch its political interests, including for the economic purposes. As Trump said in his speech, there will be closer cooperation in the military, economy, and investment between the two countries. Trump did this by evoking the ongoing sociocultural conditions in the country.

As a background information, the inaugural speech was of the total of 30 minutes in length, given by Trump on February 24, 2020. The event was attended by approximately 125,000 people in the city of Ahmedabad during his visit to India. It was quoted as a big event, prepared in great detail, to which Rs 38 lakh (equals to around 45 thousand USD) was spent on housing, meals, and logistics for the 36-hour visit.

In December 2019, about two months before Trump's arrival, India passed a law on citizenship (the Citizenship Amendment Act, or CAA). The Act is a modification to a 1955 statute that allows for the simple and expedited naturalization of "persecuted" minorities from Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Pakistan adhering to six religions—Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, and Christian—but does not name Muslims. The ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) pushed the Act through the Indian Parliament, and President Ram Nath Kovind signed it on December 12. The law has been widely protested and criticized, including by

Indian Muslims who have staged demonstrations. Several applications have been filed in the Supreme Court of India challenging the statute. Critics say the move is part of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government's Hindu nationalist agenda since it came to office nearly six years ago. Opposition parties also claim that the measure is discriminatory since it excludes Muslims from this 1.3-billion-person country. Muslims account up around 15 percent of the population.

India itself does have a long history of conflicted relations with Muslims. Even before Trump's arrival on February 23, there had been clashes between groups opposing and supporting the law. So, with Trump's speech, which mentions that the state has the right to protect sovereignty from the threat of Islamic terrorism, as the author has explained in the text section above, in the midst of the pros and cons of the Citizenship Law, things will get worse. This situation will provide two advantages for Trump: first, he can convey anti-Islamic views as he did before. Second, Trump gained sympathy in India, precisely from the ruling party, which considered him to provide support for the laws made by the Indian government. Through the speech, Trump is defending the Indian government, saying that what the government is doing through the law is not a matter of discrimination against Islam but rather an effort to protect the country from terrorism.

Of the many that can threaten India, Trump chose fundamentalist Islam as the problem raised and conveyed in his speech. The history of the emergence of Islamophobia in America after the events of September 11, 2011, may have influenced him. However, for Trump, this is not a new thing to do, and in his track record, he has often discussed the issue of Islam with a negative connotation. Both in interviews, speeches, and his writings on social media (Twitter). This attitude can be traced back to 2010, five years before his presidential candidacy, when Trump suggested America go to war against Muslims on *The Late Show*. Even foreign media have discussed Trump's anti-Muslim attitude. One of them is the medium media, which wrote 84 anti-Muslim articles and promoted Trump's Islamophobia until April 6, 2018.

Trump's anti-Muslim attitude is also translated into policy. One of them is that in January 2017, Trump issued a Muslim ban policy targeting several Muslim-majority countries that wanted to enter the United States. An Islamophobia researcher at The Bridge Initiative at Georgetown University wrote in an article that academics, legal rights experts, and advocates all noted that Islamophobia has become mainstream under the Trump administration. As a result, many American Muslims have been intimidated, and mosques have been targeted for vandalism and arson. This means that the production of negative sentences on Islam in his speech in India



is inseparable from Trump's attitude and character, which have existed for years.

The audience, or communicator, aspect of the speech also plays a big role. The Prime Minister of India with the full name Narendra Damodardas Modi, who is familiarly called Modi, joined the pro-Hindu organization, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, which is the student wing organization of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS itself has close ties to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Modi's party that came to power in India for the 2014–2019 and 2019–2024 periods. The RSS is a paramilitary organization that is allegedly the mentor who also gave birth to the BJP. There are similarities between the two organizations, which are left-wing and Hindu Nationalist. In an interview with Reuters, Modi revealed that he is a nationalist and patriotic Hindu.

“I'm nationalist. I'm patriotic. Nothing is wrong. I'm a born Hindu. Nothing is wrong. So, I'm a Hindu nationalist so yes, you can say I'm a Hindu nationalist because I'm a born Hindu. I'm patriotic so nothing is wrong in it. As far as progressive, development-oriented, workaholic, whatever they say, this is what they are saying. So, there's no contradiction between the two. It's one and the same image.”

Since joining the BJP in 1987, Modi's role in catapulting the party's name has been quite significant. Modi also made history with the first time the BJP won the Indian legislature in 1995, as well as his appointment as BJP National Secretary. After 1990, Modi became part of the government coalition through the BJP. And made the BJP the ruling party in India today. The BJP itself is suspected of supporting violence against Muslims in India, making Hindutva a party ideology. Indian-born activist Kenan Malik stated that Hindutva sees Hinduism as the only way of life in India. This ideology is also adopted by Modi.

Before becoming Prime Minister of India, Modi was said to have been involved in igniting violence in Gujarat from February 27 to March 1, 2002, by spreading seditious calls that worsened the situation. Modi and other BJP officials considered the train incident in Godhra, which caught fire and killed 58 Hindus, to be caused by terrorism by minorities. Since then, Muslims, including children and women, have been targeted. A total of 1,044 people died, 223 disappeared, and 2,500 were injured. A total of 790 of the 1,044 dead were Muslims, and 254 were Hindus.

In his article in *The Conversation*, Indiana University political science professor Sumit Ganguly noted that during the previous five years of government, Modi had indeed been unfair to Muslims. Until 2019, as many as 36 Muslims were killed or hanged. Even one of the BJP MPs, Giriraj Singh, mentioned that Muslims in India should have gone to Pakistan long ago, precisely in 1947, when Muhammad Ali Jinnah founded Pakistan.

So, what Trump said was the result of a speaker's adjustment to the audience to be addressed, namely the public, especially the Indian authorities. During the speech, Trump's claims against Islam received several rounds of applause from the audience. The author argues that this is a sign that the claim is accepted, hence increasing the potential of the spread of Islamophobia. It is clearly reflected in his speech section consisting of content related to Islam and terrorism. The fact that the section was a part of an inaugural speech for the promotion of peace in India, the content on the negativity of Islam is contradictory to the purpose of the speech in general. Relevant to the intention of the speech given to the Indian audience, the observed section of the speech is probably not misplaced; instead, reflects Trump's view on Islam and terrorism as well as his dominance.

## CONCLUSION

The analyses in the study have showcased the interconnection between a section of Trump's speech that include a negative statement about Islam to the overall sociocultural aspects surrounding its inclusion in the speech. The analysis of Trump's speech in India in this study shows an indication that Islam is portrayed negatively. Hence, it shows the manifestation of dominant power that Trump was trying to impose through his speech.

The discourse of Islamic fundamentalism in the review of discourse criticism is not an ordinary discourse in the sense that it is representative of the phenomenon of fundamentalism in Islamic society. The first time this discourse comes out, it is expected to become a stereotype and create a bad impression of a group or even a civilization. The bad impression produced by the discourse of Islamic fundamentalism is designed to be a control that can hegemonize not only the discourse maker's group but the community or society where the identity of Islamic fundamentalism is located. If the discourse maker and the targeted community have agreed on the bad representation of the group that represents a discourse, then it means that they have a common enemy that is agreed to be fought or even destroyed. This research implies some visions for the future research on similar themes. In the authors' observation, previous research has a tendency to enlarge studies on the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism, and Islamic terrorism. The exploitation of such discourses has begun to have a detrimental impact on the creation of civilizational harmony because it has clearly contributed to the creation of hostility between Muslims and the West, or the creation of Islamophobia everywhere. However, some other studies have taken a different perspective by criticizing previous studies. The current study is positioned to provide a critical review of the

discourse of Islamic fundamentalism or other similar discourses. If a discourse is crucial, then it is better to use it wisely and carefully so as not to cause certain unfavorable impacts. Future research shall be oriented towards balanced research and the creation of harmony in the world.

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